The instrumentation of public subsidies for private schools: Different regulatory models with concurrent equity implications

Analysing PSPS from a policy instruments perspective

Over the past few decades, the regulation of many education systems has evolved from a bureaucratic to a post-bureaucratic model of educational governance, in which school providers are more autonomous and diverse, families’ capacity for choice has been expanded and performance-based management encouraged (Maroy, 2009). Overall, this new form of regulatory governance implies a substantive transformation in the role of the state in education, which moves away from playing a leading role in educational provision and acts primarily as a regulator of education through legal, financial and accountability instruments (Majone, 1994; Yeung, 2010). In increasingly fragmented educational systems, the regulation of the preferences and behaviour of autonomous educational actors becomes a significant feature of public action in education. Making public funding available for private providers only adds complexity, from a regulatory perspective, to this situation.

As shown in the previous section, PSPS have been key in the expansion of private schooling in many OECD countries. Nonetheless, PSPS are a polymodal instrument that can crystallize in different policies and funding schemes (e.g. vouchers, contracted schools, charter schools), all of which embody different values, rationales and goals. Analysing PSPS from a policy instruments perspective involves assuming first that instruments’ choice and their continuous adaptation do not always respond to pragmatic reasons or follow a linear process, but rather result from the complex and ever-evolving interaction between institutions, political and economic interests, and ideas (Capano and Lippi, 2017; Peters, 2002). From this perspective, the social construction of both the problems and the policy objectives behind various instruments’ choice is a key moment in the analysis of any policy process. This implies analysing the set of problems associated with the choice or use of a given policy instrument, as well as the representations and problematizations involved in the reformulation and evolution of the instrument in question (Lascoumes and Le Galès, 2007).

The adoption of PSPS can be motivated by a wide range of rationales and objectives. As highlighted by West and Nikolai (2017), educational authorities can pursue very different policy goals and objectives when adopting PSPS. The authors note that, while certain education systems have adopted them as a means of promoting competition and other market dynamics, others use PSPS to support freedom of instruction, promote pedagogic diversification or achieve educational expansion. Thus, while in certain countries the emergence of publicly funded schools was totally aligned to the neoliberal agenda in the public sector reform of the 1980s, in other countries, the state has been funding private providers for many decades, as a means of supporting faith-based educational institutions and promoting freedom of instruction (Verger et al., 2016). It is precisely this diversity of origins and policy goals that influences – and to a great extent explains – the diversity of regulatory configurations that can be observed among those countries that have a relevant publicly subsidized private education sector.

As will be analysed in this paper, governments opt to publicly fund private schools in response to a diverse set of objectives and factors, that vary according to each country’s political, social, educational and historical context. However, the arguments used by private providers to exert pressure on political powers and to advocate public funding, seem to be more similar across national contexts. Usually, private actors emphasize the need for PSPS as a means of guaranteeing freedom of instruction and families’ right to choose; they also allege that private provision is more efficient than direct public provision.

Policy instruments do not operate as isolated devices, but as a part of broader regulatory regimes (cf. Levi-Faur, 2011). The way in which policies are instrumented and operate is contingent on their interaction with other instruments and regulations, and with the specific norms, rules and mechanisms that are established to implement them effectively. To some extent, instrumentation should be viewed as a process of policy sedimentation and layering in which one instrument might alter the enactment and effects of the other. PSPS are not absent from these interactive and relational dynamics. Expectedly, the effects of PSPS are conditioned by their assemblage with existing regulations in areas such as school choice, the entrance of new private providers in the system, school accountability or the level of autonomy that schools can enjoy, to name the most relevant. At the same time, regulatory regimes and the policy instruments that configure them are not static. They evolve over time and tend to be calibrated and re-regulated, especially when they do not achieve the expected effects or are problematized by key stakeholders.

Relatedly, another core premise of the policy instruments perspective is that, even when instruments are adopted to achieve specific behavioural or social effects, they tend to generate unexpected and even undesired effects. Policy instruments evolve in ways that are unforeseen when originally adopted; indeed, it is difficult to predict the form that any instrument will end up assuming, let alone their effects (Bezes, 2007). To a great extent, the enactment of PSPS policies has policy implications that go far beyond the mere involvement of non-state actors in the provision of education. Even when PSPS are not designed to promote market competition, their use, with the passage of time, frequently triggers market logics and mechanisms. PSPS frequently advance in parallel with higher levels of freedom of school choice and school autonomy, two features conducive to competitive attitudes and values among educational demand and supply. It follows from this that policies promoting the involvement of private schools in public education systems, end up promoting a certain level of market competition, even when they do not intend to do so, or even if this is not their primary objective. This is the case, as such arrangements alter the subjectivities and logics of action developed by schools (Jabbar, 2015; van Zanten, 2009), as well as the way in which families and students understand, engage with and ‘consume’ education (Cribb and Ball, 2005; Rizvi, 2016).

The increasing role of private subsidized education entails the coexistence of different types of provision and forms of ownership and makes educational systems more difficult to govern. The autonomy that private subsidized providers tend to enjoy becomes a challenge from a public accountability perspective, especially when educational authorities aim at aligning all types of providers with the education quality and equity goals, set at national level (Hooge et al., 2012). In fact, one of the most well documented, unintended effects of PSPS is found in the area of educational equity. Available evidence on the topic consistently shows that the involvement of private actors in educational provision tends to lead to an increase in student performance inequalities, school segregation or social stratification among schools (Alegre and Ferrer, 2010; OECD, 2012; Waslander et al., 2010). A recent report from Eurydice, comparing European education systems concludes:

Over the past few years, the regulation of the private subsidized sector has been at the centre of a debate of both a technical and political nature regarding the potential and limits of public–private mixes for educational provision. A key question in the context of this debate is whether hybrid systems of educational provision can be regulated and calibrated in such a way as to make these systems compatible with the achievement of equity goals and the fulfilment of the right to inclusive education. As we argue in this paper, the equity challenges that PSPS generate in different institutional settings are key to understanding the recent wave of educational reforms that numerous countries with hybrid systems of school provision have adopted.

Methods and data

The evidence presented in this article relies on the analysis of literature, focusing on the instrumentation and regulation of private subsidized education in OECD countries. Primary studies were gathered applying a systematic review approach. Searches were conducted in the main international academic repositories (Scopus and Web of Science), and complemented with searches in other repositories (Dialnet, HAL, Revues/OpenEditions Search) that include literature in French and Spanish. Searches were carried out using a common syntaxis, based on three groups of keywords: (a) denominations of private subsidized education; (b) dimensions of regulation and regulatory instruments; and (c) selected cases² (i.e. countries or education systems in which private subsidized education represents more than 10% of the total enrolment in primary or lower secondary education). The primary studies, gathered through these searches, were screened in two different rounds to assess their relevance for the purposes of the study. Table 1 summarizes the search and screening process of the primary studies.

Table 1. Search results and selection process.

The academic literature finally selected (n = 112) was complemented with hand searching of grey literature (i.e. reports and policy documents), as well as different studies considered relevant but not indexed in the academic literature repositories, such as working papers and articles that are not published in high-impact journals (n = 141).

All the primary studies and complementary literature selected were reviewed and systematized using extraction sheets specific to each country or education system of interest. Each one of the sheets synthesized the normative and legal provisions that characterize the PSPS’ regulatory framework in place in each country. More specifically, the review was guided by the following codes, each of which refers to a regulatory dimension of private subsidized education provision:

1. Authorization of providers. These are the legal provisions that establish the requirements with which educational providers need to comply in order to be eligible to receive public funding.

2. Funding. This dimension includes the regulation of the level of public funding received by private providers, the criteria followed to distribute public resources and which expenses are covered by these funds.

3. School choice and admissions. These constitute the legal provisions as to how the process of school choice should be organized and the admission processes schools should follow.

4. Autonomy. Relates to the level of autonomy of private subsidized providers regarding curricular, pedagogical and managerial aspects.

5. Evaluation and accountability. This category includes school inspections and evaluations, accountability measures and the participation of schools in large-scale assessments.

6. Workforce (teachers). This dimension includes certification requirements and the working conditions of teachers employed in private subsidized schools.

Additionally, and together with information in relation to the different regulatory dimensions, information regarding the recent policy developments in private subsidized education and evidence of reform were also systematized for each country. Finally, for each of the countries, we collected information relating to the historical origins of the PSPS arrangements in place, with particular attention focused on the policy goals that education administrators and decision-makers were pursuing with the establishment of such arrangements.

On the basis of this information collected and synthesized through country-specific extraction sheets, we identified, in an inductive manner, four different regulatory models of private subsidized education. The construction of the typology was primarily informed by the main policy goal that had originally motivated the adoption of a system of public funding for private schools. This was in keeping with West and Nikolai’s (2017) observations that the diversity of policy goals, pursued by PSPS, is at the root of the heterogeneity of regulatory frameworks. Thus, we grouped together those education systems in which the institutionalization of PSPS had been driven by similar or comparable motivations and values. For each of these clusters, we identified a number of regulatory patterns, i.e. regulations and normative arrangements shared by most of the countries included in the model.

It should be noted, however, that while each of the models is characterized by a number of regularities, they also exhibit a considerable degree of internal heterogeneity. Thus, while the different countries grouped into a given model share a common dominant policy goal, they might present certain inconsistencies in terms of regulatory provisions. This is the case as the same policy goal can be served by different policy instruments and also because certain PSPS are driven by a combination of policy goals and regulatory frameworks that are in a process of constant evolution. Therefore, the models represent ideal types that synthesize the main regulatory orientations and characteristics of existing educational systems, and there is not necessarily an exact correspondence between the empirical models and the referent cases. Thus, they serve analytical purposes, rather than being oriented towards accurately capturing empirical reality.

Freedom of instruction

One of the possible goals of PSPS programmes is to guarantee freedom of instruction.³ The freedom of instruction model prevails in countries such as Australia, France, Denmark and Canada, in which PSPS schemes were originally adopted as a means of ensuring the financial viability of an already existing private provision, usually managed by faith-based institutions (Barman and Edwards, 2009; Caldwell, 2010; Olsen, 2015). Within these education systems, the regulation of the private subsidized sector is oriented towards guaranteeing that private providers comply with basic quality standards in exchange for public funding, without undermining their autonomy as private educational institutions.

In Australia, France and Canada, PSPS were adopted as a response to the precarious economic situation experienced by faith-based private schools in the second half of the 20th century. The decline of religious education was often linked to the creation of a free public education system in the context of the process of educational expansion (Angus, 2003; Fowler, 1992). In this context, religious schools mobilized themselves to force the government to institutionalize a system of public subsidies for private providers and to protect freedom of instruction and the presence in the system of an already established private school sector (Caldwell, 2010; Meuret, 2004; Teyssier, 2011). An exception is Denmark, where PSPS were adopted by the end of the 19th century as a means of avoiding state and church domination in educational provision and guaranteeing a certain level of diversity within the educational offer (Olsen, 2015).

Within this model, the authorization of new private subsidized providers relies primarily on social demand criteria. Indeed, in Australia and France, attempts to reduce the centrality of social demand in the authorization of new private providers (for instance by including certain education planning criteria) have been dismissed because of the strong opposition they generated among private providers, some political parties and a percentage of the public (Guardia Hernández, 2019; Vickers, 2005). Nonetheless, since the main objective of this model is to guarantee the continuity of an existing private supply, rather than foster its expansion, the entry barriers for new private subsidized providers are frequently high. In some cases, this means that private schools are required to demonstrate an initial period of economic self-sufficiency as a prerequisite, before applying for public subsidies (Meuret, 2004; Patrinos, 2001; Van Pelt et al., 2017).

The public funding scheme for private providers only covers the operational expenses of the schools in part, either though block or earmarked grants. In line with the partial nature of public funding, subsidized private schools are allowed to charge families add-on tuition fees. In many cases, these fees represent a substantial share of the total funding of schools (Donnelly, 2012; Nusche et al., 2016; Van Pelt et al., 2017). In the case of Denmark, a country with high levels of public spending in education, school fees in the subsidized private sector are mandatory since they are considered as guaranteeing a minimum parental implication in the school (Schindler-Ragvin, 2008).

The process of school choice in the private subsidized sector is managed independently of the regulation that applies to the public sector. In most cases, the choice of private subsidized schools is not guided by catchment areas or other controlled choice policies that might apply to public schools. Private subsidized schools are allowed to establish their own prioritization criteria and are granted full autonomy to manage the process of admissions (Bosetti and Gereluk, 2016; Caldwell, 2010; Olsen, 2015).

Another feature of this model is that private providers enjoy higher levels of pedagogical and managerial autonomy than public schools. Although in most cases, private subsidized schools must follow basic national curricular standards or learning goals, they can adapt the curriculum to their specific pedagogical or philosophical approaches (Olsen, 2015). France is an exception in relation to this general trend. In France, known for its highly centralized educational system, private subsidized schools must follow exactly the same national curriculum as public schools. In order to guarantee the non-denominational nature of French education, religious private subsidized schools are allowed to offer religious courses as long as they remain optional subjects (Meuret, 2004; Pons et al., 2015). In relation to managerial and staffing decisions, private subsidized schools are also highly autonomous. This usually means that they are in charge of hiring and firing teachers, and in certain countries, they even establish their own salary scales (Caldwell, 2010; Eurydice, 2016; Olsen, 2015).

Finally, regarding evaluation and accountability, the integration of the private subsidized sector into the policies and procedures applied to the public sector is only partial. In most of the countries, private subsidized schools are required to participate in national external tests; however, inspection and evaluation procedures and requirements differ significantly between private subsidized and public schools. In most cases, the evaluation of private subsidized schools is developed internally, without the intervention of public authorities (OECD, 2013).

Equivalence

The second model refers to educational systems in which public funding for private subsidized schools has been adopted as a means of guaranteeing freedom of instruction, but also seeking equivalence between private subsidized and public sectors. Broadly speaking, the regulatory approach of this model can be characterized as an ‘exchange logic’, according to which the equalization of public funding received by private subsidized and public schools, is paralleled by the loss of autonomy of private providers in areas such as school admissions, the curriculum or evaluation and accountability.

Most of the education systems grouped in this model can be considered as ‘old quasi-markets’ (Vandenberghe, 1999) or historical public–private partnerships (Verger et al., 2016), in which education provision managed by faith-based institutions is a long-standing tradition. In most cases, the institutionalization of private subsidized education took place in a context in which the state needed to expand provision to respond to an increasing educational demand. This was the case in England⁴ and Belgium in the 1950s (De Rynck, 2005; Walford, 2003) and Spain in the 1980s, after the end of the military dictatorship (Calero and Bonal, 1999; Olmedo, 2013). In most of these national contexts, the historical role of faith-based education provision played an important role as an argument and source of legitimization of private providers advocating the adoption of PSPS. In the Netherlands, Belgium and Spain, private providers also argued that national constitutions guaranteed freedom of instruction and that private education institutions should be supported by state funding (Bonal, 2000; Dupriez and Maroy, 2003; James, 1984).

The equivalence logic has clear consequences from a regulatory point of view. Firstly, private subsidized and public schools are funded through the same scheme, and the level of public funding for both sectors is essentially the same (Danhier and Friant, 2019; De Groof, 2004; Patrinos, 2013). In the majority of cases, the public funding that schools receive depends partially on the socioeconomic characteristics of their student body, in order to compensate for the social stratification between private subsidized and public schools (for instance, through formula funding arrangements). Secondly, and in exchange for the equalization of the public funding received, private subsidized schools are prohibited from charging add-on tuition fees, or families’ financial contributions are considerably restricted, only representing a small percentage of the total funding received by schools (De Groof, 2004; Nusche et al., 2015; Patrinos, 2013; Vogels, 2002, as cited by Levin et al., 2013). Ireland and Spain are exceptions to this pattern. Despite the equivalence goal, the public funding received by private subsidized schools in both countries is significantly lower than in public schools. In Ireland, this is the case as public funding to cover all operational expenses is only provided for private subsidized schools that do not charge fees to families (Rougier and Honohan, 2015). In the case of Spain, private subsidized and public schools are funded through different schemes and arrangements. This has led to a significant difference in the public funding received by the private and the public sector over the years, in favour of the latter, thereby encouraging private subsidized schools to charge fees to families (Pérez-Díaz and Rodríguez, 2011; Rogero-García and Andrés-Candelas, 2014).

Within this model, the authorization of new private subsidized providers is mainly based on the social demand of schools. However, such considerations are frequently combined with certain educational planning criteria. For example, in the Flemish and French-speaking communities of Belgium and the Netherlands, the potential contribution of the new school to the pedagogical diversification of the school supply in the local area is taken into account when authorizing new providers (Maussen and Vermeulen, 2015; Ministère de la Fédération Wallonie-Bruxelles – Direction des Relations Internationales, 2016; Vlaams Ministerie van Onderwijs en Vorming, 2020). Similarly, in England, education authorities consider the existing supply of religious education in the local area as a criterion for the authorization of a new denominational subsidized school (Walford, 1995). In Spain, private providers need to demonstrate the existence of an unmet demand in the area where they are located as a requirement for receiving public funding (Villarroya, 2000).

School choice in private subsidized education tends to be regulated through controlled school choice systems or common admissions and prioritization criteria. In Spain and England, catchment areas are equivalent for private subsidized and public schools, and admissions are regulated by the same procedures and prioritization criteria (Roberts and Danechi, 2019; Vega-Bayo and Mariel, 2018; Walford, 2003). In Belgium (Flemish and French-speaking communities), the assignment of school places is managed in a centralized way and relies on the common criteria of students’ prioritization in the case of overdemand (Cantillon, 2011; Lambrechts and Geurts, 2008). Nevertheless, in the Netherlands and Ireland, both private subsidized schools and public schools enjoy autonomy to manage the process of admission, although only private subsidized schools are legally permitted to consider students’ religious (and philosophical in the case of the Netherlands) beliefs as prioritization criteria in relation to applications (Ledwith and Reilly, 2013; Patrinos, 2013; Vermeulen, 2004).

The level of school autonomy enjoyed by private subsidized schools tends to be lower than in the previous model. In terms of curricular aspects, private subsidized and public schools have to follow the national curriculum and achieve the learning standards established by educational authorities (Darmody et al., 2012; Eyles and Machin, 2019; Rouw et al., 2016; Walford, 2003). Regarding the management of human resources, while private subsidized schools have a greater level of discretion with regard to the staff hiring process than public schools, certification requirements and salary scales tend to be harmonized between public and private subsidized schools (Eurydice, 2016; Nusche et al., 2015; Rougier and Honohan, 2015 as cited by Skerrit and Salokangas, 2020).

Finally, regarding evaluation and accountability, and in line with the equivalence objective, there are, formally speaking, no significant differences between private subsidized and public providers in terms of inspection procedures and external assessments (OECD, 2013).

Market competition

Certain countries adopted PSPS with the explicit goal of promoting market competition within the educational system. Although most PSPS programmes tend to generate a certain level of competition between schools, the distinctive feature of this model is that competition is a central programmatic goal, and that competition is promoted at system level.

The market competition model of education regulation is part of the broader pro-market approach to public sector reform, which materialized with the emergence of neoliberalism in the 1980s. According to the neoliberal doctrine, the public funding of private providers constitutes a means of actively encouraging private sector participation in educational provision, increasing the ability of families to choose and fostering competition between schools through funding schemes focused on demand. Competition is conceived as a mechanism undermining the ‘monopolistic’ situation of the state as a provider, incentivizing schools to perform and respond better to ‘clients’ demands and, overall, improving both the quality and the efficiency of the educational system. Uncoincidentally, the funding modality in which this model tends to crystallize is the so-called voucher scheme, a per-capita funding mechanism that encourages schools to compete in order to attract students.

The most emblematic national cases representing this model are Chile and Sweden. In both countries, the market competition approach is characterized by the adoption of a voucher scheme and high levels of decentralization. In Chile, market reform in education was adopted at the beginning of the 1980s, in the context of the military dictatorship led by General Augusto Pinochet (Bellei and Vanni, 2015), whereas in Sweden it was adopted at the beginning of the 1990s by a conservative government. The market reform in Sweden surprised the world in the sense that it became a counter-intuitive case of a market approach in a highly developed social-democratic welfare state (Klitgaard, 2008; Wiborg, 2013). In both countries, the adoption of PSPS was justified as a means of promoting competition in the education system, but also because of the supposed superiority of the private sector in terms of efficiency and effectiveness (Chubb and Moe, 1990).

In both Chile and Sweden, private subsidized schools, in addition to funding from vouchers, have been allowed to charge families add-on fees. The possibility of schools charging fees was accompanied by a reduction in the value of the public subsidy. These add-ons have encouraged and exacerbated the social segmentation of the school system generated by market competition. For this reason, recent educational reforms have banned the schools from charging add-on tuition fees and have raised the value of public subsidies accordingly (Böhlmark et al., 2016; Centro de Estudios Mineduc, 2017).

Within this model and in line with market principles, the authorization of new providers originally relied exclusively on social demand criteria (Böhlmark et al., 2016; Grau et al., 2018) and had few restrictions on the type of providers allowed to operate and receive public funding. Thus, in both countries, private schools were initially entitled to public funding as long as they had enough demand, and for-profit providers were eligible for public subsidies. Nonetheless, over the past few years, regulatory reforms adopted in Chile and Sweden have placed more significance on educational planning criteria. In the case of Chile, these changes have been paralleled by the establishment of more discriminant entry criteria. The Inclusion Law, adopted in 2015, impedes for-profit providers from receiving public funding, and prohibits the authorization of new publicly funded schools in areas with oversupply (Muñoz and Weinstein, 2019).

School choice procedures also follow a market logic; families frequently have the right to choose any private subsidized school, independently of their place of residence. In the case of Chile, oversubscribed schools have enjoyed a certain level of discretion in selecting students or in defining admission criteria. Nonetheless, this situation has also changed as a result of the 2015 Inclusion Law. Currently the admission procedures in all publicly funded schools are centralized in a unique platform, the main objective being to reduce the opportunities for schools to select students according to academic ability or socioeconomic status (Carrasco and Honey, 2019).

In terms of school autonomy, private subsidized schools must follow the national curriculum but can adapt it according to their philosophical or educational orientation (OECD, 2017c; Wennström, 2020). Schools also enjoy freedom to choose their pedagogic approach and have the authority to make important decisions in relation to budgets, school staff and organization (for instance, in terms of the school timetable). In contrast, public schools are more strictly subordinated to the prerogatives of local education authorities in many of these domains (Rönnberg, 2011; Santiago et al., 2017). All publicly subsidized schools, regardless of their ownership, take part in the performance-based accountability system; however, there are schools’ and teachers’ evaluation procedures in place that are different in the case of public and private schools. The results of external evaluations are published in school rankings, browsers or similar artefacts to promote and inform school choice.

Autonomy for educational diversification

The last regulatory model identified covers education systems that have encouraged the private management of public schools and the expansion of a private network of school providers with high levels of pedagogical, curricular and managerial autonomy. Here, the main goal is to subsidize private schools, which are exempt from following certain public regulations, as a means of diversifying the educational offer and favouring the generation of school improvement dynamics within the system. The line between this model and the market competition model is thin and porous, since school autonomy is a necessary condition for competition between schools. In fact, the autonomy model has advanced in certain countries that attempted to promote more dramatic market reforms in the past, which, however, did not progress. Accordingly, market advocates had to be content with ‘second best’ pro-private sector solutions, such as charter schools in the US and Academies in England.

The main argument behind the educational reforms that have given way to this model is that public school provision is excessively uniform, rigid and is somehow captured by corporatist interests. In addition, PSPS have the potential to unlock this situation, foster innovation and diversify the school offer accordingly. These reforms also emphasize equity values since they have often been adopted under the guise of giving more opportunities of choice to socially disadvantaged populations, particularly since social justice arguments have played a central role in the legitimation of such schemes (Gorard et al., 2019; Vergari, 2007).

The autonomy model has tended towards equating the funding allocated to public and private schools. When first adopted in the 1990s, public subsidies did not cover the total expenses of Academies and charter schools, but at the same time, these schools were not allowed to charge fees to families. It was expected that the school owners would resort to sponsors, philanthropic organizations or competitive funding calls to complement the public baseline funding. Nonetheless, the English PSPS system has evolved towards equalization with public schools’ funding (West and Nikolai, 2017). In most US states, charter schools’ managers can apply for different sources of public funding, which are usually available to support them in providing for students with special educational needs.

Initially, the Academies programme targeted socially disadvantaged areas; however, a reform adopted in 2010, allowed public schools to convert to Academies in all types of contexts; the same reform also allowed the creation of new Academies, known as Free Schools (Wiborg, 2015). Academies require the authorization of the Department for Education and have a non-profit owner, either a private foundation or a trust. Charter schools, in turn, need to be authorized by an external agency, which can be a school district, an NGO or a university. In certain US states, the charter school sector is liberalized, whereas in others (22 out of 51) there is a cap on the number or proportion of charter schools.⁵

Regarding school choice, families seeking a school place in an Academy in England need to follow the established procedure for accessing public schools. Nonetheless, Academies can establish prioritization criteria in cases of overdemand (Roberts and Danechi, 2019). In the US, admission criteria to charter schools have evolved in parallel to broader school choice policies, with a tendency towards more freedom of choice. Accordingly, in the vast majority of states, charter schools can admit students from outside their district and, in fact, from any location within the state. Charter schools typically manage their own admission process, but in the case of overdemand, they are obliged to select their students’ intake randomly, for instance, applying a lottery system (Skinner, 2014).

School autonomy is the cornerstone of this regulatory model. Both charter schools and Academies enjoy high levels of autonomy in terms of curricular, pedagogical, budgetary and organizational aspects. This high level of autonomy is intended to favour pedagogic innovation, as well as the customization of the educational project of schools to contextual particularities. These schools also have autonomy in relation to staffing decisions, and in defining the school calendar and timetables (Podgursky, 2006; West and Currie, 2008). Especially in the US context, charter schools tend to be more intense with regard to classroom hours than public schools, which, in fact, has become one of the main ‘selling points’ of this type of school offer.

Academies and charter schools also have a great deal of authority as regards defining the school curriculum (Bulkley and Fisler, 2003; Exley, 2017; Roberts and Danechi, 2019). However, in practice, this freedom is restricted by the strong presence of external evaluations and accountability measures in the educational system. While the quality-assurance mechanisms are the same for public and private subsidized schools, evaluation and accountability instruments are particularly consequential in the subsidized private school sector, since underachievement in literacy, numeracy and/or other subject areas could lead to the discontinuity of the public funding contract. Thus, accountability pressure is especially tangible in these schools, significantly affecting their curricular decisions and instructional strategies.